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Abstract 
 
The paper reports on ongoing research into the development of a management system 
to co-ordinate a set of activities of a virtual organisation for the production of 
chemicals.  The paper reports on the authors’ experience in considering a real virtual 
organisation and raises issues of co-ordinating atomic activities that span across 
organisational boundaries and deals with systems that possess a high degree of 
autonomy and dynamicity. The focus here is on determining the requirements in terms 
of the co-ordination of parallel activities, trust and security issues such as access 
control, validation of resources and identities, formalisation, risk analysis and finally 
fault tolerance. 
 
Keywords: Trust Requirements, Spheres of Control, Software Application 
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Introduction 
 
In organisations of vital importance is trust, which is essential for them to work 
effectively or at all.  Means of facilitating trust are the formalisation of procedures 
such as manuals, specifications, or contracts.  Other ways are in personal interactions 
which give confidence to interested stakeholders that activities will be undertaken 
satisfactorily.  In the virtual organisation context, an important difference is that these 
personal interactions are either severely curtailed, are not possible, or even 
discouraged.  This increases perceived risk for the stakeholders as their trust in their 
partners reduces. 
 
To mitigate against this, a virtual organisation will require a computer-based 
management system which will give stakeholders confidence that activities carried 
out by others are occurring in a manner that they are comfortable with – here this will 
be referred to as a trust management system.  In order to fulfil this requirement, this 
system will need to have a number of interlocking components.  These are a formal 
language for policy expression, verification of user credentials against policies, 
contract expression and validation, risk assessment and generation, and maintenance 
of reputation values for all participants. 
 
Although procedures and bureaucracy enhance trust, they are also time consuming 
and inconvenient.  In the virtual context these are manifested as login requirements, 
password usage and other protocols.  Dependability is largely considered a trade-off 
between security and convenience.  The inconvenience of bureaucratic mechanisms in 
real life is experienced through tasks such as the time and human resources needed to 
undertake specified tasks; in the virtual world this will manifest as additional 
processing capacity, resources, etc. 
 
A lack of bureaucratic mechanisms in virtual organisations can result in problems 
such as unauthorised access, loss of information, deceit, etc.  The legal framework, in 
current English law (Walden, 2004), hardly supports the notion of a virtual 
organisation which encompasses issues such as virtual agreements (contracts) as well 
as the ones mentioned earlier.  Therefore there is a need to provide mechanisms which 
will bridge this gap1.  In computing literature there are two notions of trust: that of 
access control and resource validation, and that which encompasses the wider 
business sense which deals with risk analysis. 
 
There has been a significant amount of research examining risk analysis aspects 
which relate to trust (e.g. Josang and Presti, 2004); this paper, however, focuses on 
structural issues (McKnight and Chervany, 2002) and includes access control, 
authentication, and policy making.  The view taken is that fault tolerant structuring 
will promote trust and hence dependability, while at the same time minimising the 
risk of security breaches. 
 
To illustrate these facets of trust management in a virtual organisation, an example 
from the chemical engineering industry has been chosen.  The business challenges 
that this industry faces in the United Kingdom includes the outsourcing of the 
majority of chemical production to low cost countries, such as China and India.  To 
mitigate against these challenges a number of responses have been identified (Cavalla, 
2003).  In terms of market forces, Lien and Perris (1996) include shorter product 
lifecycles; the production of speciality products (e.g. food and pharmaceutical); 
improved and consistent quality; more ‘agile’ and efficient performance of multi-
product processes.  They also state that reduced lead times, compression of the design 
lifecycle – ‘time to market’ (Beßling et al, 1997), and the integration of legislation 
and standards into the development process will play an important role in increasing 
the competitiveness of the UK chemical engineering industry. 
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 Although it is outside the scope of the current paper, it must be remembered that organisations may 
not trust the data that they receive even if it can be electronically guaranteed to be correctly passed by 
others.  For example, there may be feelings of unease as to its accuracy and that it may be falsified.  
Brown and Lockett (2004) discuss the importance of trusted third parties which may go someway in 
tackling this crucial issue. 
 Crucially, Lein and Perris (1996) have identified that more flexible and responsive 
manufacture, distribution and supply, is also critical in improving the chances of the 
UK chemical engineering industry being able to compete.  They state that virtual 
organisations (‘extended enterprises’) are likely to play an important role in 
responding to the threat posed by low-cost overseas competition.   
 
The paper reports on work which is part of the GOLD project (Grid-based 
Information Models to Support the Rapid Innovation of New High Value-Added 
Chemicals).  GOLD is concerned with highly dynamic organisations whose formation 
and sole purpose is the satisfaction of a market opportunity.  Consequently the virtual 
organisation is disbanded or reformulated to pursue other market opportunities.  The 
GOLD project aims to deliver the enabling technology to support the formation, 
operation and successful dissolution of virtual organisations. Middleware 
technologies are to be developed to address issues such as trust, security and 
information management for virtual collaboration between companies.  
 
Virtual Organisations and GOLD 
 
From the above, it may be seen that GOLD differs from most of the so-called virtual 
organisations referenced within the computing literature which usually describe 
organisations that are built over time and last for a number of years (Nayak el al, 
2001), CISCO systems being a good example.  Of particularly concern are 
organisational entities that can be rapidly integrated to exploit a market opportunity. 
To enable this, a set of standards will need to be defined which all participating 
organisational entities will adhere to.  The result of such an exercise is not a virtual 
organisation as such, but in effect a virtual market of potential collaborations across 
organisational boundaries.  Hence a virtual market is a set of autonomous 
organisational entities that conform to a set of pre-determined rules that guide the 
integration process.  These rules may deal with low level protocols, security issues 
such as access control, description of interfaces as well as high level policies such as 
ownership of service, data, etc. Dynamic virtual organisations are represented in the 
following diagram.  The cones (nodes) represent the market, that is, a set of 
organisational entities that conform to market rules.  The lines represent the flow of 
information between organisational entities.  Each topology reflects a particular a 
market opportunity being exploited. 
 
 
           
 
Figure 1.  Virtual Markets and Topologies of Virtual  
Organisations within the Virtual Market. 
 
From the above, a virtual organisation could be defined as a manifestation of a 
network of enterprises within a virtual market for the sole purpose of exploiting a 
market opportunity as described by the virtual organisation’s topology.   
 
GOLD Lifecycle 
 
In the chemical engineering sector, the production of a chemical is realised via the 
outsourcing of a number of activities that span from gathering data about a particular 
chemical and safety analysis through to production.  For that purpose several vendors 
may be involved.  GOLD will provide the platform through which this type of 
collaboration can be achieved.  The majority of activities are outsourced to various 
companies all of which can communication with each other using GOLD.  From a 
computer science perspective, issues which need to be addressed are the crossing of 
organisational boundaries, carrying out contract management, providing access and 
indirect access to certain resources, assessing the associated risk at all times, co-
ordinating atomic activities while at all times remaining dependable.  The following 
figure shows three activities of GOLD. 
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Figure 2.  Part of the GOLD lifecycle for the production of a chemical. 
 
Figure 2 above illustrates part of the life cycle of GOLD.  Responsibility for 
composing the whole service resides with GOLD, which in this case is the production 
of a specific chemical.  Some of the activities may be carried out in parallel.  For that 
purpose distributed controllers are used that handle specific activities (indicated in 
Figure 2 as c).  The diagram shows GOLD distributed controllers which are software 
modules which handle specific pre-determined activities.  Before the concept of 
distributed controllers is explained, we take a look at general dependability needs 
requirements that gave rise to their requirements will be examined. 
 
Dependability Issues 
 
The nature of the system to be built will be largely deterministic since it is bound by 
contractual arrangements.  That is not to say however, that the state space is either 
small or manageable.  From a dependability point of view, a number of issues need to 
be dealt with such as fault analysis, trust management and risk analysis.  Although 
fault analysis to a larger extent, and trust management to a lesser, are issues that have 
been addressed in computer science literature, risk assessment and its relation to 
exception handling is somewhat novel.  In this paper the implication is that rather than 
simply using distributed exception handling techniques to handle transactions, 
distributed risk assessment tools will be used that can optimise the parallelisation of 
activities (within the chemical engineering life cycle) and determine the cost/benefit 
and consequence of all transactional activity (regardless of its output) with each of the 
organisational units. 
 
Here, both fault tolerance techniques will be used such as forward error recovery 
(FER) and backward error recovery (BER).  In cases, for example, of a breach of 
contract, it cannot be assumed that a failure or return to the previous non-erroneous 
state will occur.  Forward recovery is required to ensure that the system is constantly 
moving towards its goal state (i.e. production of the chemical) by applying correction 
techniques to the erroneous state.  In the case of a breach of contract scenario, 
especially if it is late in the development of the chemical, ideally the error should be 
corrected, for example, by using a new service provider.  In cases, however, of 
transacting with a particular service provider, it will be necessary to apply backward 
recovery in order to resume a transaction that reached the erroneous state. 
 
Exception handling is the mechanism by which FER and BER may be implemented 
and is an important aspect of the system (Garcia and Rubira-Calsavara, 2001).  
Exception handling in general contains a number of hidden properties that can both 
hinder or enhance the performance of the system depending on its structure and 
deployment of handlers.  In the case here, it is mostly dealing with specific activities 
some of which are co-dependant in terms of input/output, while others may be 
parallelised.  An example of the former in the later stages of the chemical engineering 
lifecycle would be the legal requirement of a full HAZOP (HAzard and OPerability 
study) having to be completed before plant operation/chemical production is begun.  
An example of the latter being work associated with the scale-up of a proposed 
chemical synthetic route being run in a more parallelised manner with synthetic route 
development.  Hence, scalability of a potential route may be considered to be 
practically in parallel with the traditional criteria for chemical route selection leading 
to a more rapid solution and a time saving for chemical development lifecycle. 
 
The optimisation of processes in this manner is what hopefully will give a competitive 
advantage to those using GOLD.  Parallelisation of activities requires the propagation 
of exceptions, which in turn implies distributed exception handling capability for the 
system.  Here the issue of distributed exception handling and risk analysis (associated 
with each particular distributed parallel activity) will be addressed by providing 
different application layers, each of which possesses different degrees of authority.  
Propagating an exception to a higher layer implies that decisions have to be taken by 
the application layer of the higher authority.  Propagation of exceptions however, may 
imply ‘flooding’2 especially as the number of parallel activities increases.  Therefore 
the concept of spheres of control (Davies, 1978) will be used to enhance the 
dependability approach with the concept of error confinement.  This implies that 
handlers are dedicated to address specific faults raised by specific parts of the system, 
while faults that cannot be dealt within the sphere are propagated to a higher layer. 
                                                 
2
 ‘Flooding’ in this context means that too many exceptions are created for the exception handlers to 
cope with. 
 Arguably trust and trust management are somewhat ill defined in the computing 
literature.  This paper does not seek to clarify these definitions, suffice to say that the 
distinction is made between the concept of trust as a ‘calculated risk one willingly 
accepts’ or a ‘reliance placed by a on b to deliver’, and trust management which 
encompasses authorisation issues and access control.  The concept of reputation is 
also being explored as part of the GOLD project.  The reputation of the service 
provider is important in a competitive market such as chemical production.  
Mechanisms are being explored where activities carried out by various organisational 
entities have a weighting by which GOLD can use to make decisions regarding 
service composition.  The majority of the concepts regarding structure are envisaged 
via the controllers shown previously Figure 1.  They allow a conceptualisation of 
distributed autonomous decision making while at the same time providing error 
confinement and structured exception handling.  Controllers are ‘aware’ of the 
grouping of activities, trust management issues, risk management issues and 
exception handling.  In order to facilitate the distributed production of chemicals, the 
technology encompasses all the theoretical issues that have been discussed earlier.  
The following diagram examines their structure. 
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Figure 3.  Controller Structure and basic components. 
 
The cross-organisational interface serves the purpose of linking the organisational 
units with the controllers.  Across the interface, information is passed such as the 
contract definition, the authorisation policies, the user’s credentials as well as the 
details of the service.  The service brokerage component maintains details of interface 
specifications of each organisational unit with the potential of carrying out a particular 
activity.  The exception handler may be thought of as a set of managers which deal 
with unusual (but predictable) events raised by the activity that the exception handler 
monitors.  They assist the activity in resolving problems locally and support the 
concept of error confinement.  The access control, contract management and the risk 
assessment modules are now examined in more detail. 
 
Access Control 
 
Traditionally, trust has been engendered between organisations with the help of legal 
agreements.  These formal and explicit contracts can be read by (solicitors of) all 
parties and form important legal agreements of what can be expected (at least to a 
degree) by all parties.  In the virtual context, Walden (2004) notes that data is even 
more transient than in traditional arrangements.  Thus the use of technology allows 
arguments to be made that technical malfunction, interference and fabrication have 
occurred – hence the importance of mitigating against this as described previously.  In 
the United States of America, electronic signatures now have the same legal status as 
those which are written.  This has reduced the liability of electronic transactions.  In a 
multi-stage product lifecycle such as that in the chemical industry, the virtual 
organisation concept would mean that different enterprises would, as in the traditional 
context, have to use electronic signatures (or other means) on proposals, contracts and 
other documents.  Furthermore, these enterprises need, in some form, to be ‘aware’ of 
each other.  Awareness mechanisms may be considered to be a resolution to the issue 
of latent forms of co-operation which may take place between the nodal points of the 
virtual organisation.  Here awareness is defined as the comprehension of activities and 
goals.  The converse of awareness is privacy.  Issues relating to the privacy of data are 
crucial to trust in a virtual organisation.  A number of trust management proposals 
tackle problems of anonymity or lack of adequate data to verify one’s identity by 
requesting additional information without enough attention on the legal aspects of 
privacy.  Privacy is a policy-level issue and relates to the use of data in the context of 
consent established by the data owner.  Mechanisms for privacy of elements in a 
virtual organisation are necessary in order to prevent monitoring of sensitive activities 
and confidential data.  The balance between awareness and privacy may well be very 
delicate as in a highly dynamic virtual organisation partners may also simultaneously 
be competitors elsewhere.  To achieve this balance at the level of the controller, the 
following schema may be used. 
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Figure 4.  Access Control Requirements. 
Figure 4 illustrates a very small part of a virtual organisation’s activities for the 
production of a chemical.  An activity, for example such as ‘collect data for 
chemical’, requires the usage or interrogation of a number of sources (e.g. databases, 
web content, and documents).  The associated controller will ensure that the activity 
will be carried out according to time, quality and quantity specifications set by 
GOLD.  At the same time, controllers are aware of the critical nature of those 
activities and their impact on the overall aim of GOLD (i.e. production of chemical).  
As such, they are able to carry out exception handling related to each particular 
activity as well as risk assessment.  Additionally, activity specific security and trust 
requirements such as access control, contract management are also handled here.  The 
concept of distributed activity specific controllers allows support of security and 
dependability, while at the same time delegating responsibilities from the main 
authority (which is GOLD) to different application layers. 
 
In Figure 4, Company A has a requirement to produce a safety assessment (SA) for 
the production of a chemical production where there are a number of autonomous 
organisational entities shown within organisational boundaries.  Firstly, Company A 
requests details about the chemical from company B.  Company B consults a number 
of databases (which may be remote or in-house), and uses the data returned to 
produce Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and Physical Properties documents (PP) 
which are maintained locally.  Company B grants access to company A to view the 
documents.  Company A then uses these documents to produce a safety assessment.  
The assessment is actually carried out by company C.  Access to MSDS and PP is 
required by company C in order to comply.  Company A uses its access rights to 
company B to grant access to company C to view the documents.  Company C 
produces the safety assessment report and grants view access to company A.  
Company A uses this report to make a decision whether or not to produce the 
chemical.  The example demonstrates the importance of a number of issues and 
requirements such as: 
 
• Access control over remote locations, crossing organisational boundaries. 
• Indirect access control via a third trusted party. 
• Dependability assessment access on resources via three or more parties. 
• General dependability concerns regarding responsibilities on quality 
assessment or reliability of objects that are accessed via apparently transparent 
domains. 
 
Therefore there is a need to not only address issues of access on remote objects but 
also delegation of responsibility and indirect access via a third party.  In Figure 4, 
which is a depiction of a chemical production process, there is a need to provide 
mechanisms which would allow company B to effectively collaborate with C (access 
MSDA and PP documents) for the purpose of carrying out the request to provide 
Company A with data.  There a number of dependability issues relating to 
constructing systems by propagating or delegating responsibilities as mentioned by 
Armstrong and Paynter (2002) and Armstrong (2003).  
 
Contract management 
 
Contract management is a difficult concept to deal with in the chemical engineering 
virtual organisation domain.  This is because there are a number of pre-existing 
contracts with a number of pre-defined terms of reference and clauses, which are used 
to rapidly outsource part of the life cycle of the development of a chemical (ICHEM, 
2003).  It is part of the requirements of GOLD to provide an electronic medium 
through which this rigid and rather standardised approach is supported and enhanced.  
This issue will be dealt with here using structured exception handling (Romanovsky et 
al, 2003) and verification techniques.  Consider the following diagram. 
 
 
      
Figure 5. Promela Usage for Contract Validation 
 
As Figure 5 indicates, the Promela programming language (SPIN, 2004) is being used 
to express pre-defined contracts formally (Molina-Jimenez et al, 2003; Solaiman et al, 
2003).  The controllers which act as brokers in this first instance (i.e. the period of 
time for composing the service from autonomous organisational entities3) will pass 
the details of the contract (i.e. the Promela definitions) through a pre-existing 
interface to the potential service provider.  It is at the discretion of the service 
provider to validate the contract definition against certain properties such as 
deadlocks, reachability and assertion violations.  Upon validation by the service 
provider a response is sent to GOLD to either indicate the provider’s commitment to 
the contract or disagreement.  The way this disagreement will be handled is via 
exception handlers.  The handler may, for example, decide to outsource the service to 
a new service provider and follow the same process (shown faded in figure 5).  
Additionally if this option is not possible the handler may propagate the exception to a 
higher authority within GOLD.  
 
                                                 
3
 Autonomous organisational entities are combined to form a service.  This service therefore enables 
the simplification of processes and the virtual organisation will be able to operate with greater 
efficiency and/or efficacy. 
 
Risk Analysis 
 
The risk assessment component evaluates the progress of the activity based on the 
exceptions thrown.  Additionally, the component has two interfaces for propagating 
problems to a higher authority.  These can be considered as the interfaces of the 
sphere of control.  The exception propagation interface propagates exceptions thrown 
by the activity and cannot be dealt with locally.  For example, if the activity cannot be 
completed for any reason then the system needs to be informed.  Similarly the risk 
assessment interface propagates assessments of risk evaluation to the higher authority 
where the overall risk assessment is held.  This particular idea deviates from the 
typical exception handling process (such as that discussed by de Lemos (2003)) in the 
sense that even if FER or BER are successful, the risk may have increased (due for 
example, to the time taken for an exception to be dealt with) to the point where the 
main authority considers terminating the entire process.  This is an issue raised by the 
particular critical nature of the domain to which this is applied and additionally the 
risk associated with parallelising activities.  The way risk is dealt with in the first 
instance is presented in the following diagram. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Risk Assessment using spheres of control. 
 
In Figure 6 above, each box denotes a sphere of control inside which several parallel 
activities take place as indicated by the horizontal lines.  When an activity raises an 
exception e, the controller ct, catches the exception and starts a hander H.  The 
accumulated risk associated with handling the exception is estimated and 
communicated to the local risk assessment activity.  Depending on whether it reaches 
a critical level (as it has in the second handler) the controller sends the information to 
the overall risk assessment tool. 
 
Future Work 
 
From what has been discussed in this paper, it can be seen that there are many 
challenges which will be involved in fulfilling the objectives of the GOLD project.  
The high-level conceptualisations described here will require further research in order 
to yield practical solutions to support a virtual chemical engineering organisation.  It 
will be crucial to know the business/organisational issues surrounding these topics.  
This will help in the understanding of how (or whether) companies will be willing to 
participate in a virtual organisation.  Appropriate theories will need to be identified 
which will help to provide insights into these issues. Modelling of business processes 
will be undertaken to show how a virtual organisation may work.  This will then need 
to be linked to the more technical computer science level shown here.  Research will 
therefore be required to determine how this may be undertaken. 
 
A robust application is being designed using layered exception handling that allows 
delegation or propagation of responsibility using concepts such as spheres of control 
and error confinement.  This will manifest itself in the form of controllers.  The access 
control model will be designed to handle all requirements of the individual policy 
makers as well as techniques for the verification and validation of user’s credentials.  
Of particular challenge will be the delegation of responsibility in the form of granting 
access to an entity to resources via three or more parties.  Furthermore, the compilers 
for Promela contracts using web services and XML schemas will be used. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper has presented some requirements and conceptual models for dealing with 
the general security and trust issues which have arisen when considering a real virtual 
organisation that deals with chemical development.  In an industry where the 
traditional model of work is outsourcing the idea of virtual organisation where much 
of the bureaucracy, and therefore time and effort, is eliminated or greatly minimised is 
almost revolutionary.  This however poses a great deal of effort and responsibility on 
the actual information systems that manage the formation, operation and dissolution 
of the virtual organisation.  In this paper a number of requirements regarding security 
and trust have been presented alongside potential conceptual models for dealing with 
these issues.  
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